The DOJ Office of the
Inspector General Report :
Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane Investigation A Short Outline of the Executive Summary
(prepared by Brian T. Lynch, MSW)
1.
“… the FBI opened Crossfire Hurricane on July
31, 2016, just days after its receipt of information from a Friendly Foreign
Government
a.
Papadopoulos "suggested the
Trump team had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that it could
assist ... with the anonymous release of information ... damaging to Mrs.
Clinton
b.
The FBI… (EC) open[ed] the Crossfire
Hurricane investigation state[ing] that… "this investigation is being opened to
determine whether individual(s) associated with the Trump campaign are witting
of and/or coordinating activities with the Government of Russia."
c.
[The OIG] did not find information …
indicating that any information other than the FFG information was relied upon
to predicate the opening of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.
d.
FBI officials involved … had reason
to believe that Russia may have been connected to the Wikileaks disclosures …
in July 2016, and were aware of … Russia's efforts to interfere with the 2016 U.S.
elections.
e.
[The FBI] did not become aware of
Steele's election reporting until weeks later and we therefore determined that Steele's
reports played no role in the
Crossfire Hurricane opening.
2.
The FBI assembled a …team of special
agents, analysts, and supervisory special agents …[to] conducted an initial
analysis of links between Trump campaign members and Russia. Based upon this …analysis,
the Crossfire
Hurricane team [as they were known] opened individual cases in August
2016 on four U.S. persons - Papadopoulos, Carter Page, Paul Manafort,
and Michael Flynn- all of whom were affiliated with the Trump campaign
at the time the cases were opened.
3.
Crossfire Hurricane was opened as a
Full Investigation and all of the senior FBI officials who participated in
discussions about whether to open a case told [The OIG] the information warranted
opening it…. [T]he combination of the FFG [foreign friendly government]
information and the FBI 's ongoing cyber intrusion investigation of the July
2016 hacks of the Democratic National Committee's (DNC) emails, created a counter-intelligence
concern that the FBI was "obligated" to investigate.
4.
Additionally, …[the OIG] concluded
that the
FFG information, provided by a government the [U.S.] Intelligence
Community (USIC) deems trustworthy, and describing a first-hand account from an
FFG employee of a conversation with Papadopoulos, was sufficient to predicate the
investigation. This information provided the FBI with an articulable
factual basis that, if true, reasonably indicated activity constituting either a
federal crime or a threat to national security, or both, may have occurred or
may be occurring.
5.
[The OIG] also sought to determine whether
there was evidence that political bias or other improper considerations
affected decision making in Crossfire Hurricane, including the decision to open
the investigation … General Counsel, and a FBI Deputy General Counsel. We
concluded that …the investigation was in compliance with Department and FBI
policies, and [the OIG] did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that
political bias or improper motivation influenced [the] decision.
6.
The Crossfire Hurricane
investigation was properly designated as a "sensitive investigative
matter," or SIM, by the FBI because it involved the activities of a
domestic political organization or individuals prominent in such an
organization …We concluded that the FBI satisfied the DIOG's approval and
notification requirements for SIMs.
7.
8.
The AG [and DIOG] Guidelines require
that the " least intrusive" means or method be "considered"
when selecting investigative techniques … Each of [the initial steps] authorized
under the DIOG was a less intrusive investigative technique.
9.
Thereafter, the Crossfire Hurricane
team used more intrusive techniques …[The OIG] determined that the CHS
operations conducted during Crossfire Hurricane received the necessary FBI
approvals.
10. [The
OIG] found it concerning that [DOJ] and FBI policy [do] not require the FBI to
consult with any Department official in advance of conducting CHS operations
involving advisors to a major party candidate's presidential campaign …and [The
OIG] include[ed] a recommendation to
address this issue.
11. At
the request of the FBI, the Department filed four applications with the FISC
seeking FISA authority. targeting Carter Page. The first application on October
I , 2016, and three renewal applications on January, April, and June , 2017.
a.
… the Crossfire Hurricane team's receipt of
Steele's election reporting…played a central and essential role in the FBI's
and Department's decision to seek the FISA order.
b.
…the same day that the Crossfire Hurricane team
first received Steele's election reporting, the team contacted FBI OGC again
about seeking a FISA order for Page and specifically focused on Steele's
reporting in drafting the FISA request.
c.
Although the team also was interested in seeking
FISA surveillance targeting Papadopoulos, the FBI OGC attorneys were not
supportive. FBI and NSD officials told [the OIG] that the Crossfire Hurricane
team ultimately did not seek FISA surveillance of Papadopoulos, and…no
information indicat[ed] that the team requested or seriously considered FISA
surveillance of Manafort or Flynn.
d.
[The OIG] did not find documentary or
testimonial evidence that political bias or improper motivation influenced the
FBI's decision to seek FISA authority on Carter Page.
e.
However, as we explain below, the Department
decision makers who supported and approved the application were not given all
relevant information.
f.
[The OIG] found that the FBI did not have
information corroborating the specific allegations against Carter Page in
Steele's reporting when it relied upon his reports in the first FISA
application or subsequent renewal applications.
g.
However, absent corroboration for the factual
assertions in the election reporting, it was particularly important for the
FISA applications to articulate the FBI's knowledge of Steele's background and
its assessment of his reliability.
h.
[The OIG] review found that FBI personnel fell
far short of the requirement in FBI policy that they ensure that all factual
statements in a FISA application are "scrupulously accurate."
i.
[The OIG] identified multiple instances in which
factual assertions relied upon in the first FISA application were inaccurate,
incomplete, or unsupported by appropriate documentation, based upon information
the FBI had in its possession at the time the application was filed. [This included]
the following seven significant inaccuracies and omissions:
i. Omitted
information the FBI had obtained from another U.S. government agency detailing
its prior relationship with Page…
ii. Included
a source characterization statement asserting that Steele's prior reporting had
been "corroborated and used in criminal proceedings,"
iii. Omitted
information relevant to the reliability of Person 1, a key Steele sub-source
iv. Asserted
[incorrectly] that the FBI had assessed that Steele did not directly provide to
the press information in the September 23 Yahoo News article based on the
premise that Steele had told the FBI that he only shared his election-related
research with the FBI and Fusion GPS…
v. Omitted
Papadopoulos's consensually monitored statements…in September 2016 denying that
anyone associated with the Trump campaign was collaborating with Russia or with
outside groups like Wikileaks in the release of emails
vi. Omitted
Page's consensually monitored statements…that Page had "literally never
met" or "said one word to" Paul Manafort and that Manafort had
not responded to any of Page's emails…
vii. Included
Page's consensually monitored statements…that the FBI believed supported its
theory that Page was an agent of Russia but omitted other statements Page made
that were inconsistent with its theory, including denying having met with Sechin
and Divyekin, or even knowing who Divyekin was…
j.
Further, as we discuss later, we identified 10
additional significant errors in the renewal applications.
k.
[The OIG] found that the team had speculated
that Steele's prior reporting had been corroborated and used in criminal
proceedings without clearing the representation with Steele's handling agent,
as required
l.
[The OIG] concluded that these failures created
the inaccurate impression in the applications that at least some of Steele's
past reporting had been deemed sufficiently reliable by prosecutors to use in
court, and that more of his information had been corroborated than was actually
the case.
m.
[The OIG] found no evidence that the 0I
Attorney, NSD supervisors, ODAG officials, or Yates were made aware of these
issues…
n.
Although [the OIG] found no evidence that [James]
Comey had been made aware of these issues at the time he certified the [FISA] application…multiple
factors made it difficult [to] determine the extent of FBI leadership's
knowledge as to each fact…in the FISA applications. These factors included…limited
recollections, the inability to question Comey or refresh his recollection with
relevant, classified documentation because of his lack of a security clearance,
and the absence of meeting minutes that would show the specific details shared
with Comey and [Andrew] McCabe during briefings.
12. the
FBI closed Steele as a CHS for cause in November 2016. However…despite having
been closed for cause, the Crossfire Hurricane team continued to obtain
information from Steele through [a Department Attorney, Bruce] Ohr, who met
with the FBI on 13 occasions to pass along information he had been provided by
Steele.
a.
…the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) expressed
concern about the lack of vetting for the Steele election reporting and
asserted it did not merit inclusion in the body of the [Intelligence Community
Assessment (ICA) report.
b.
…the FBI, including Comey and McCabe, sought to
include the reporting in the ICA. Limited information from the Steele reporting
ultimately was presented in an appendix to the ICA.
c.
…the FBI's Validation Management Unit (VMU)
completed a human source validation review of Steele in early 2017. The VMU
review found that Steele's past criminal reporting was "minimally
corroborated," and included this finding in its report that was provided
to the Crossfire Hurricane team.
d.
The VMU review also did not identify any
corroboration for Steele's election reporting among the information that the
Crossfire Hurricane team had collected. However, the VMU did not include this
finding in its written validation report …and therefore members of the Crossfire
Hurricane team and FBI executives were unaware of it.
e.
[The OIC] further determined that the Crossfire
Hurricane team was unable to corroborate any of the specific substantive allegations
regarding Carter Page contained in the Steele’s election reporting which the
FBI relied on in the FISA applications.
13. …the
FBI filed three renewal applications with the FISC… In addition to repeating
the seven significant errors contained in the first FISA application…[the OIG]
identified 10 additional significant errors in the three renewal applications…[each
outlined in the report]
a.
Among the most serious of the 10 additional
errors we found in the renewal applications was the FBI's failure to advise OI
or the court of the inconsistences… between Steele and his Primary Sub-source
on the reporting relied upon in the FISA applications.
b.
FBI also failed to share other inconsistencies
with OI, including the Primary Sub-source's account of the alleged meeting
between Page and Sechin in Steele's Report 94 and his/her descriptions of the
source network.
14. [The
OIG] concluded that the failures described [in their] report represent serious
performance failures by the supervisory and non-supervisory agents with
responsibility over the FISA applications. These failures prevented OI from
fully performing its gatekeeper function and deprived the decision makers the
opportunity to make fully informed decisions… this was a failure of not only
the operational team, but also of the managers and supervisors, including
senior officials, in the chain of command.
15. [The
OIG] did not identify a specific Department policy prohibiting [Department
attorney Bruce] Ohr from [having multiple meetings] with [Christopher] Steele, [Glenn]
Simpson [the owner of Fusion GPS], or the State Department and providing the
information he learned from those meetings to the FBI…[However the OIG] concluded
that Ohr committed consequential errors in judgment by ( 1) failing to advise
his direct supervisors or the DAG that he was communicating with Steele and
Simpson and then requesting meetings with the FBI's Deputy Director and
Crossfire Hurricane team on matters that were outside of his areas of
responsibility, and (2) making _himself a witness in the investigation by
meeting with Steele and providing Steele's information to the FBI.
16. The
FBI's CHS Policy Guide (CHSPG) provides… [that] a handling agent must not
initiate contact with or respond to contacts from a former CHS who has been
closed for cause absent exceptional circumstances that are approved by an SSA. [The
OIG] concluded that the repeated contacts with Steele should have triggered the
CHS policy requiring that such contacts occur only after an SSA determines that
exceptional circumstances exist…[and that]… 13 different meetings [between
Steele and] Ohr over a period of months…created a relationship by proxy that
should have triggered…a supervisory decision about whether to reopen Steele as
a CHS or discontinue accepting information indirectly from him through Ohr.
17. …the
Crossfire Hurricane team tasked several CHSs, which resulted in multiple
interactions with Carter Page and George Papadopoulos, both before and after
they were affiliated with the Trump campaign, and one with a high-level Trump
campaign official who was not a subject of the investigation. All of these CHS
interactions were consensually monitored and recorded by the FBI…[the OIG]
found no evidence that the FBI used CHSs or UCEs to interact with members of
the Trump campaign prior to the opening of the Crossfire Hurricane
investigation…[and] found no evidence that the FBI placed any CHSs or UCEs
within the Trump campaign or tasked any CHSs or UCEs to report on the Trump
campaign. [The OIG] also found no documentary or testimonial evidence that
political bias or improper motivations influenced the FBI's decision to use
CHSs or UCEs to interact with Trump campaign officials in the Crossfire
Hurricane investigation.
18. While
[the OIG] concluded that the investigative activities undertaken by the
Crossfire Hurricane team involving CHSs and UCEs complied with applicable
Department and FBI policies…in certain circumstances Department and FBI
policies do not provide sufficient oversight and accountability for
investigative activities that have the potential to gather sensitive
information involving protected First Amendment activity, and therefore [the
OIG] include[d] recommendations to address these issues.
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